Fake stores and non-delivery
Shops with heavy discounts that take payment and ship nothing, or ship something else. Often one operator behind dozens of near-identical stores.
A website OSINT investigation finds out who is behind a site that is hurting your business: a shop selling fakes of your products, a phishing page copying your login, a look-alike domain emailing your customers. It also shows which other sites the same people run, so you remove the network rather than one page.
A website OSINT investigation uses domain registration data, hosting and DNS history, certificate logs, archived pages and the site's own content to establish who operates a website and what else they run. Registrant names are often hidden, so attribution usually comes from connections between sites. OSINT-S delivers a graded attribution and an evidence pack ready for takedown requests.
Websites that defraud your customers, copy your brand or target your staff, and the businesses that need to know whether a site is legitimate.
Shops with heavy discounts that take payment and ship nothing, or ship something else. Often one operator behind dozens of near-identical stores.
Sites using your product photos and trademarks. We map the store network, payment routes and suppliers where they surface publicly.
Counterfeit investigations →Pages imitating your sign-in, invoice portal or checkout, and the infrastructure shared with earlier kits.
Phishing intelligence →Registrations that swap a character, add a word or use another extension, often set up for email fraud against your customers or suppliers.
Six layers of public records, each answering a different part of the question. No single layer is enough on its own.
| Layer | What it can show | Typical limits |
|---|---|---|
| Registration data | Registrar, creation date, status, sometimes the registrant organization | Personal registrant details usually redacted or behind a privacy service |
| DNS and hosting history | Where the site has been hosted and which domains shared servers or mail settings | Shared hosting links many unrelated sites |
| Certificate logs | Every certificate issued for a domain and its subdomains, with dates | Shows infrastructure, not people |
| Archived versions | Earlier content, owners' names before they were removed, previous business on the domain | Coverage is uneven |
| Site content and code | Reused templates, contact details, tracking and payment identifiers shared with other sites | Templates are sold widely; identifiers matter more |
| Business and court records | A company named in the site's terms, its directors, prior complaints and litigation | Names on scam sites are often borrowed |
Since 28 January 2025, RDAP rather than WHOIS is the definitive source of registration data for generic top-level domains. Certificate Transparency logs add a public record of certificates issued.
ICANN announced that from 28 January 2025 the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) became "the definitive source" for registration data of generic top-level domains such as .com and .shop, and that the older WHOIS service was sunset on the same date. RDAP adds structured output, internationalization and the ability to give differentiated access to registration data (ICANN). For most scam domains the public record still shows the registrar, dates and status, but not the registrant's name.
Certificate Transparency, specified in RFC 6962, publicly logs TLS certificates as they are issued. For an investigation, those logs show when a look-alike domain was prepared, which subdomains were set up for phishing and which other names were issued together, sometimes before the site goes live.
The registrant's identity is usually held by the registrar or a privacy service. It is obtained through the registrar's disclosure process, a court order or a police request; our findings often support that request.
Operators reuse what is expensive to change: payment accounts, analytics and ad identifiers, contact details, servers and suppliers. Those reuses connect one site to the next.
Scam shops and phishing kits are rarely one-offs. The same tracking identifier, customer-service number, refund policy text, merchant name or server can tie a single domain to a cluster of fifty. Clusters matter twice: a takedown request that covers the whole network stops the operator moving customers to a sister site, and a cluster that includes one older, careless registration often leads to a named business or person.
We grade each link as confirmed, likely or possible and keep coincidences out. Shared hosting or a common template on its own is not attribution. Contact details found along the way can be checked through our email address and phone number investigations, and the money side through fraud investigations.
Each finding is organized for the party that can act on it: the registrar, the host, the payment provider, the platform or a court.
Takedown requests succeed when they are specific: the abusive URL, the rights or policy breached, captures with dates and the link between sites. We prepare that pack, and when you want the requests filed and followed up, the work moves into phishing domain takedown or wider brand protection. Where customers lost money, the same evidence supports a complaint to the police.
We check the purpose before accepting a case and do not use domain work to locate private individuals.
A one-page answer, a map of related sites, graded attribution and a takedown-ready evidence pack. Focused cases from 10 business days.
A quick legitimacy check on a single site can sometimes be finished in a business day. Attribution of a scam store or phishing domain with its related sites takes from 10 business days, and a large counterfeit network across several countries up to about a month. A senior analyst reviews every report; the price is fixed after written scoping, urgent delivery costs 50% more, and the fee goes down if we miss the agreed date. Domain work is part of the OSINT services we provide to brand and fraud teams.
Share the URL, what the site is doing and who is affected. We confirm the purpose, capture the site before it moves and reply with a fixed quote.
Usually, yes. We look at registration and hosting records, certificate logs, archived versions and the store's own identifiers such as payment, tracking and contact details, then find other sites that share them. The result is a map of the store network with graded attribution. Even when no name is confirmed, the network evidence makes takedown requests to registrars, hosts and payment providers far more effective.
Often, through connections rather than the record itself. Redacted registration data is normal, and since January 2025 RDAP has replaced WHOIS as the definitive source for generic domains, but it still rarely shows a private registrant's name. Attribution comes from what the operator reused across sites. The registrar can also disclose registrant data on a valid request or court order, which our findings help support.
Treat it as urgent and warn your finance team and key suppliers today. We can usually capture the domain, its mail setup, certificates and related registrations within a business day, and show whether it belongs to a wider campaign. Getting it suspended means a request to the registrar or host with that evidence, which we prepare and, if you want, file as part of our domain takedown work.
Yes. We check the domain's age and history, whether the company named on the site exists in its registry with matching directors and address, whether the photos and certificates are copied, and whether the same contact details appear on scam warnings or other sites. A single-site check can sometimes be done in a business day; a fuller company verification takes from 10 business days.
We do not unmask critics or journalists exercising lawful speech, and we do not hand over home addresses for direct contact. If the content is defamatory or threatening, your lawyer can pursue it, and we can document what was published and when, so the legal route has a solid record. Where the site is part of fraud or impersonation, attribution work is in scope.
Sources checked 9 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.