Supplier and partner due diligence
Beneficial ownership, directors and their other interests, litigation, adverse media, sanctions and restricted-party links, and signs that a company is a front for someone else.
Due diligence →Defense OSINT research answers the questions defense companies, investors and research teams face before they sign: who owns this supplier, could this partner create export-control or sanctions problems, and how is this market moving? We use only public and commercially available information, for lawful purposes.
Defense OSINT, written defence OSINT in British usage, is open-source research on companies, people, markets and risks in the defense sector. OSINT-S supports defense companies, investors and research teams with supplier and partner due diligence, export-control and sanctions exposure checks, market research and insider-risk awareness. We do not support targeting, battlefield analysis or anything involving classified information.
We research the commercial side of defense: companies, ownership, compliance exposure and markets. We do not support military operations.
Defense businesses buy open-source research for ordinary decisions with unusual stakes: a new subcontractor, a joint venture abroad, an acquisition target. The answers come from registries, courts, procurement data, filings and trade media. Some requests are outside our scope for any client:
Four lines of work, each tied to a decision: approving a supplier, entering a partnership, investing, or protecting your people and programs.
Beneficial ownership, directors and their other interests, litigation, adverse media, sanctions and restricted-party links, and signs that a company is a front for someone else.
Due diligence →Whether counterparties, their owners or their end users appear on restricted-party lists, and whether trading patterns or corporate links raise red flags your export compliance team should review.
KYC and AML →Who supplies what to whom, budget and procurement trends, competitors' contract wins and partnerships, and how a niche of the market is developing, all from published sources.
Competitive intelligence →What open sources reveal about your programs, staff and facilities, and the approaches hostile recruiters or fake companies use, so your security team can close the gaps.
Digital footprint assessment →Our checks are organized around the US, UK and sanctions frameworks your compliance team already works under; we provide the evidence, your counsel makes the legal calls.
| Framework | What it controls | What open-source research adds |
|---|---|---|
| ITAR (US, 22 CFR parts 120–130) | Defense articles and services on the US Munitions List (part 121), administered by the State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (eCFR) | Who sits behind a foreign partner or broker, and whether its owners or end users raise concerns |
| EAR (US Commerce) | Dual-use items; releasing controlled technology or source code to a foreign person in the US counts as a "deemed export" (15 CFR 734.13) | Nationality and affiliation context for partners and visiting delegations, from public records |
| UK export controls | Military and dual-use items under the Export Control Order 2008 (legislation.gov.uk), licensed by the Export Control Joint Unit (GOV.UK) | End-user and intermediary background before a license application |
| US sanctions | Entities owned 50% or more in aggregate by blocked persons are themselves blocked (OFAC 50 percent rule) | Ownership tracing beyond the name on the list |
The US government's Consolidated Screening List combines restricted-party lists from Commerce, State and the Treasury, but it tells users to check the official lists before acting (trade.gov). A list search is the start. The harder risks sit in what lists do not show: new shell companies, nominee directors, shared addresses and family links. We are not export-control lawyers and do not classify items or decide license questions; we give your compliance team and counsel a documented picture of the counterparty.
Published budgets, procurement notices, filings, patents and trade press show where demand, competitors and partners are heading.
World military expenditure reached $2,887 billion in 2025, up 2.9% in real terms and the eleventh consecutive annual increase, according to SIPRI (SIPRI, April 2026). Growth on that scale brings new entrants and new subcontracting chains.
Typical questions: which firms are winning contracts in a product niche, who supplies a prime contractor's subsystems, and how a competitor's partnerships have changed. We answer from procurement portals, award notices, company accounts, patents, exhibitor lists and specialist press, marking what is confirmed and what is inferred. Capability research stays at the level a trade analyst would publish.
We show what an outsider can learn about your programs and people from open sources, so your security team can reduce exposure; we do not surveil your employees.
US cleared contractors must establish and maintain an insider threat program to gather, integrate and report information indicative of a potential or actual insider threat (32 CFR 117.7). Open-source awareness supports that work from the outside in: job ads describing sensitive programs, talks and posts revealing project details, public profiles that make staff easy to approach, and fake recruiters contacting them.
The output is an exposure review for your security team, with practical fixes and awareness material. It is not monitoring of individual employees. Any work touching named staff needs a documented lawful basis, the involvement of HR and legal, and proportionate scope; regulated vetting belongs with employee screening run under the applicable rules.
Governments and NATO treat open-source intelligence as a core discipline, which is why open-source findings are a credible basis for commercial risk decisions.
The US intelligence community defines OSINT as intelligence derived exclusively from publicly or commercially available information that addresses specific requirements (IC OSINT Strategy 2024–2026). NATO has its own allied doctrine for open-source intelligence, AJP-2.9, and a December 2025 RUSI Journal article describes the Alliance as increasingly recognizing OSINT's contribution to intelligence sharing (RUSI Journal). In 2022, NATO's Allied Command Transformation asked nations and industry for input on its future OSINT capability (HQ SACT request for information).
Our work sits on the commercial side of that picture. We apply the same discipline of requirements, verification and sourcing to the questions a defense business or investor has to answer, and for public-sector buyers we describe our approach on the OSINT for government page.
A lawful-purpose check and written scope come first; focused work takes from 10 business days, comprehensive reviews up to about a month.
When the question is legal classification, classified matters or operational military work, you need counsel, the authorities or cleared government channels.
For a counterparty in an unrelated sector, start with company investigations or browse our OSINT services for other sectors. A focused check starts from 10 business days, and urgent delivery adds 50% to the fee.
Send the counterparty, the decision and your deadline. We reply with a written scope and a fixed quote, under NDA if you need one.
Yes. We trace ownership through registries and filings, identify directors and their other interests, and check the company, its owners and known affiliates against sanctions and restricted-party lists, including entities caught by the OFAC 50 percent rule. We also look for front-company signs such as shared addresses or recent incorporation. A focused check takes from 10 business days, and the report feeds your export compliance review.
Yes. Pre-deal research covers founders' backgrounds, litigation and adverse media, the cap table as far as filings show it, foreign investors and their owners, key partners, and export-control or sanctions concerns. It shows whether to proceed and what to ask in formal due diligence. Comprehensive reviews take up to about a month.
Screening tells you whether a name appears on a list. Open-source research tells you who stands behind the name: owners, directors, related companies, past enforcement actions, other suppliers and customers, and whether the end use described makes sense for that business. We document each finding with its source so your team and counsel can rely on it. We do not classify items or advise on license decisions.
Yes. An exposure review looks at what an outsider can collect: job advertisements, conference material, press releases, procurement notices, and public profiles that describe program details or make staff easy to approach. Findings are aggregated into themes with practical fixes and awareness material. Work touching named employees needs a documented lawful basis and the involvement of HR and legal.
Yes. Market research uses published budgets, procurement portals, contract awards, company accounts, patents, trade-show material and specialist press. We map suppliers, partnerships and contract flows and mark what is confirmed versus inferred. The work stays at the level of commercial and policy analysis: no classified material, no targeting and no assessment of military operations.
No. We do not locate, track or profile military units, facilities or personnel, do not provide battlefield or targeting analysis, and do not handle classified or leaked government material. These limits apply to every client. We can help with commercial questions such as supplier ownership, compliance exposure or market structure, where open sources support a lawful business decision.
Often, yes. After written scoping we confirm whether the questions can be answered in time; urgent delivery adds 50% to the fee, and small, well-defined tasks sometimes take a single business day. If a full answer is not realistic, we propose a first phase on the issues most likely to change the vote.
Sources checked 7 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.