Roles and approvers
Staff profiles, team pages and press quotes that show who handles payments, IT support and executive diaries.
An OSINT audit of your organization shows what anyone can learn about your company from what you and your people publish: who approves payments, which suppliers you use, where your sites are, which systems you run. We map that exposure, rank it by attacker value and give each finding to the team that can fix it.
An organizational OSINT audit, sometimes called an OSINT assessment, reviews what your company exposes through its website, job ads, staff profiles, supplier references, events, documents and code. OSINT-S collects it passively, rates each finding by how much it would help phishing, payment fraud or intrusion, and assigns it to an owner in security, communications, HR or procurement, with a disclosure policy to stop it returning.
Both start from the same public sources. An audit is a governance exercise that ends in fixes and policy; reconnaissance feeds an authorized attack simulation.
| Organizational OSINT audit | Red team reconnaissance | |
|---|---|---|
| Question | What are we exposing, and who should change it? | How would an attacker get in, and would we detect it? |
| Audience | Security, communications, HR, procurement, leadership | Red team, penetration testers, detection engineers |
| Output | Exposure register by owner, disclosure policy, staff guidance | Target list, pretext themes and attack paths for a test |
| Methods | Passive research only | Passive research, then active testing under rules of engagement |
| Next step | Remove, reword or restrict what is published | An authorized test of systems or people |
If you already plan a test, buy red team OSINT reconnaissance, or a social engineering assessment for staff. If you want less to find before anyone tests you, start with an audit. For one person or family rather than a company, see the personal digital footprint check.
Exposure usually comes from ordinary business channels, each run by a different team. MITRE ATT&CK lists this kind of collection as Gather Victim Org Information (T1591).
Staff profiles, team pages and press quotes that show who handles payments, IT support and executive diaries.
Case studies, logos, tender awards and integration pages that name vendors an attacker can pose as.
Event schedules, travel posts, results dates and office closures that show when approvals are rushed.
Office photos, delivery instructions, planning filings and job ads that reveal entrances, badges and shift patterns.
Job ads, public code, slide decks and document metadata that name software, versions and internal hostnames.
Domains and profiles copying your name that are ready for use against staff or customers.
Phishing domain takedown →Most findings cannot be patched by IT. They are fixed by the team that publishes them, under a disclosure policy that sets what is shared and by whom.
ATT&CK notes that this reconnaissance "cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls" because it happens outside your network (MITRE ATT&CK T1591). The control is what you publish. The UK NCSC, the government's cyber security authority, advises organizations to ask what website visitors need to know and what detail is unnecessary but useful to attackers, to pay particular attention to high-profile staff, to be aware of what partners and suppliers reveal, and to set a clear digital footprint policy for all users (NCSC).
| Owner | Typical finding | Typical fix |
|---|---|---|
| Finance and security | Accounts payable contacts and approval chain easy to reconstruct | Generic mailboxes, call-back rule for bank detail changes |
| HR and recruiting | Job ads listing exact security tools and versions | Describe skills, not the stack |
| Communications | Executive travel and event appearances posted in advance | Post after the event; brief assistants |
| Procurement | Supplier logos and contract awards on public pages | Agree with suppliers what each side publishes |
| Engineering | Public repositories and documents with internal names or keys | Review before publishing; revoke and rotate exposed keys |
Where executives' own names are the problem, the audit pairs well with executive impersonation work; where staff passwords are already circulating, with leaked credential monitoring.
We audit the organization, not its employees' private lives, and report personal details only where they show an organizational risk.
An exposure register by owner, an executive summary, a draft disclosure policy and a debrief. A focused audit takes from 10 business days.
You receive an exposure register with each finding's source, capture, risk rating, mapped technique, owner and fix; a two-page summary for leadership; a draft disclosure policy; and a debrief for the owners. A focused audit of one brand and its leadership takes from 10 business days; a group with several brands or regions takes up to about a month. Urgent delivery costs 50% more, a senior analyst reviews every report, the quote is fixed after written scoping and the fee goes down if we miss the agreed date. All work is under NDA.
Many organizations repeat the audit yearly or after a merger, a leadership change or a rebrand, and compare the registers to show progress. Corporate audits sit within our OSINT services for corporate security teams; see also OSINT for corporate security.
Tell us which brands, sites and leadership roles are in scope and whether a test is planned. We reply with a written scope and a fixed quote.
The audit covers what your website, job ads, staff profiles, supplier references, events, documents and code reveal, and what attackers could do with it around the announcement, such as fake invoices from the target's suppliers. A penetration test checks whether systems can be broken into. The audit is passive, ends in fixes owned by communications, HR, procurement and security, and can feed the next test.
It is often more useful for smaller companies, because a few public details, such as who approves payments and which bank and suppliers you use, are enough for a convincing fraud attempt. A focused audit of one brand and its leadership takes from 10 business days and produces a short list of fixes that mostly need policy changes, not new tools.
Most fixes are about timing and detail, not silence. Post event appearances afterward rather than in advance, describe skills instead of exact tools in job ads, avoid naming who approves payments, and agree with customers and suppliers what case studies say. The audit ranks findings so marketing changes only what helps attackers, and the disclosure policy gives them a clear rule to follow.
Public professional information can be processed for security purposes under a documented legitimate interest where the GDPR applies, provided it is necessary and proportionate. We limit scope to work-related information, report patterns rather than profiles, and share named findings only with the person concerned or the security lead. Check with your data protection officer whether employees should be informed beforehand.
If you want to reduce exposure, start with the audit: it is passive, needs no rules of engagement for active testing and gives you fixes quickly. If you want to test detection and response, go to the red team, ideally after fixing the obvious exposure so the test measures what remains. Many organizations do the audit, fix the top findings, then commission reconnaissance and testing.
Sources checked 10 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.