Changed bank details
A "supplier" announces a new account. We test whether the email came from the supplier's real system or a copy of its domain.
A business email compromise investigation starts the moment a finance team realizes a payment went to the wrong account. Three questions follow: whose mailbox did the fraudster use, who received the money, and is it still happening? We answer the outward-facing part of all three and package the evidence for your bank, insurer and lawyers.
A business email compromise investigation reconstructs how a fraudster persuaded your staff to pay: which variant was used, whether the email came from a look-alike domain, a spoofed address or a real compromised mailbox, which campaign and infrastructure sit behind it, and who controls the receiving account. OSINT-S grades each finding and delivers evidence for bank recalls, insurance claims and supplier disputes.
BEC works because it hides inside normal payment routines. The FBI counted $55.5 billion in exposed losses over a decade.
Each variant targets a different routine, so the investigation starts in a different place.
A "supplier" announces a new account. We test whether the email came from the supplier's real system or a copy of its domain.
An urgent, confidential transfer request. We look for look-alike domains and other companies targeted with the same pretext.
Executive impersonation →An "employee" asks HR to change their bank account. We trace the receiving account to known mule patterns.
Real estate, legal or deal payments redirected at the last step, often after a long period of reading the thread.
Fraudsters pose as your outside advisers, using their names, signatures and letterheads.
Requests for staff tax or personal records, later used for further fraud. The FBI notes BEC is also used to obtain personal data.
The answer decides who investigates the breach, whether the supplier shares responsibility, and what your insurer will ask for.
| Scenario | Typical signs | Who leads which part |
|---|---|---|
| Look-alike domain | One letter changed, a different ending, a domain registered days before the email | We map the domain family, the infrastructure and other targets; takedown can follow |
| Spoofed display name or address | Real-looking sender, but replies go elsewhere and authentication fails | We analyze the original message and the reply-to infrastructure |
| Your mailbox compromised | Fraudster knew internal threads; mail rules forward or hide messages | Your IT or incident response firm investigates logs; we cover the outside infrastructure |
| Supplier's mailbox compromised | The email came from the supplier's real system | The supplier's IT investigates; our evidence supports the conversation about who bears the loss |
For a one-off check of a single sender address, an email address investigation is the lighter option. Inside-the-network work belongs with incident response; look-alike domains can be removed through phishing domain takedown.
The bank details in the fraudulent email are the most valuable lead: they name a bank, often a company, and sometimes a pattern seen in other cases.
Where the receiving account is held by a company, we check when it was formed, who directs it, whether its address and officers recur across other companies, and whether it has any business that could explain a payment of your size. Personal accounts are often held by money mules, recruited through job or romance offers. Account holder and transaction records come from the bank through your lawyers or the police, not from us; our findings help justify those requests and identify where the money went next.
Recall first, then preserve, analyze, link and report. Our work starts in parallel with your bank's.
Focused BEC cases take from 10 business days; urgent work around a recall or claim deadline is possible.
You receive a timeline of the fraud, the mailbox finding, a map of the infrastructure and recipient entities, and recommendations. A single domain check can sometimes be done in a business day; a focused case takes from 10 business days. Urgent work costs 50% more, and if we miss the agreed date the fee goes down. Insurers handling crime and cyber claims can see our page for insurance.
BEC cases are part of the OSINT services for finance and legal teams we run as one team.
Call your bank first. Then send us the original emails, the invoice and the payment details. We reply with a scope, a delivery date and a fixed quote.
Your bank can try to recall the funds and, later, disclose the account holder to the police or a court. A business email compromise investigation shows how the fraud worked: whether the supplier's real mailbox, a look-alike domain or a spoof was used, what other targets the infrastructure hit, and who stands behind the receiving company. That matters for your insurer and any dispute with the supplier.
Often we can narrow it down from the original messages. Headers, authentication results, reply-to settings and the sending infrastructure show whether the email came from the supplier's real system or a copy. If it came from their system, their IT team needs to look at their logs. Our report sets out the evidence neutrally, which helps lawyers and insurers settle who bears the loss.
Yes, briefly. A stopped attempt usually means the group has your names, roles and payment routines and will try again, perhaps through another staff member or a supplier. A short investigation identifies the look-alike domains, the wider campaign and other domains registered for you, so you can block them, warn staff and ask for takedowns.
A dated timeline of the fraud, the mailbox finding with its evidence, the domains and infrastructure involved, the recipient entities and how confident we are in each point. Every fact has a source and a capture. Tell us the insurer's questions at the start so the report answers them directly; your incident response firm's log findings can sit alongside ours.
We can investigate the sending address and the receiving bank account from open sources: where the address appears, links to other campaigns, and what is publicly known about the account holder or receiving company. We do not access mailboxes or bank systems. Account holder details come from the bank through the police or a court order, which our findings can support.
The bank comes first, as fast as possible, because recalls work best while money is still moving. Report to the police or IC3 at the same time. Then contact us so evidence is preserved before emails are deleted and look-alike domains go offline. We can start the same day for urgent cases.
Sources checked 10 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.