Officers and shareholders
The employee, a spouse, a sibling or a former colleague listed in the vendor's company records, now or in earlier filings.
A procurement fraud investigation begins with a pattern someone noticed: a vendor that always wins, invoices that never quite match deliveries, a buyer who will not let anyone else handle one supplier. We look outside your systems for the links that explain the pattern: who owns the vendor, who they are related to, and who else bid.
A procurement fraud investigation tests whether contracts and payments were steered by hidden relationships. OSINT-S checks who owns and runs suspect vendors, links them to employees through registries, addresses, relatives and shared contacts, and compares competing bidders for common owners or coordination. Your internal audit team holds the transaction data; we add the outside evidence and grade each link.
Most cases fall into four schemes. Your data shows the anomaly; open sources usually show the relationship behind it.
| Scheme | Red flags in your own data | What open sources can show |
|---|---|---|
| Fictitious or shell vendor | New vendor, round-number invoices, no delivery records, approvals by one person | Formation date, officers, a virtual or residential address, no trading footprint |
| Kickbacks | Prices drift above market, one buyer protects one supplier | Buyer's or relatives' links to the supplier's owners, side companies, sudden lifestyle changes |
| Undisclosed conflict of interest | Employee involved in selecting a vendor they never declared a link to | Directorships, shareholdings, shared addresses and family ties in public records |
| Bid rigging | Same winner, few bidders, losing bidders become subcontractors | Common owners, addresses, phones or staff among competing bidders |
Corruption, which includes kickbacks, bid rigging and conflicts of interest, appears in almost half of occupational fraud cases, with a median loss of $150,000.
The ACFE's fraud classification, based on its Occupational Fraud 2026: A Report to the Nations, puts corruption in 45% of cases with a median loss of $150,000. Its corruption branch covers conflicts of interest and bribery, and bribery splits into invoice kickbacks, bid rigging and purchasing schemes (ACFE Fraud Tree).
These schemes need two sides, an insider and an outsider, and the outsider side is visible in company registers, filings, property records and online. That is where an OSINT investigation adds what an internal audit cannot see.
Six kinds of link come up again and again. Any one can be innocent; several together usually are not.
The employee, a spouse, a sibling or a former colleague listed in the vendor's company records, now or in earlier filings.
The vendor's registered or trading address matches an employee's home, a relative's property or another vendor.
The same phone number, personal email or web host behind the vendor and the employee's other activities.
A vendor formed weeks before its first order, or ownership changed just before a contract award.
No staff, premises, website or trading history to match the value of its invoices.
Shell company investigations →Property or companies acquired by the employee or relatives that a salary does not explain.
Asset tracing →Collusion between bidders shows in the bids themselves and in hidden links between the companies submitting them.
The US Department of Justice describes four forms of bid rigging: bid suppression, complementary or "cover" bidding, bid rotation and subcontracting to losing bidders. Among its warning signs: the same company always wins, fewer than the usual number of bidders, a winner that subcontracts to unsuccessful bidders, and proposals from different vendors with "identical calculations or spelling errors" (DOJ Antitrust Division).
Open sources add the ownership side: bidders with common shareholders or directors, the same address or phone number, a shared accountant or web host, or staff who move between them. Public bodies can see our page for government.
From your list of vendors and staff to graded links your counsel can put to interviews, discipline or a referral.
Focused vendor reviews take from 10 business days. We work only from outside sources, so nobody is alerted.
A handful of vendors can be reviewed from 10 business days; a full supplier base or a multi-country network takes up to about a month. Urgent work costs 50% more, and if we miss the agreed date the fee goes down. Everything is confidential, under NDA where you need one.
Procurement work is one of the OSINT services for audit and compliance teams we run as one team.
Share the vendors, the contracts, the people in scope and your deadline. We reply with a scope, a delivery date and a fixed quote.
Your data shows the anomaly; a procurement fraud investigation shows who is behind the vendor. We check when and by whom it was formed, its officers and owners over time, its address and footprint, and links to the approver or their relatives through registries, property and contact records. Each link is graded, so your counsel knows what is solid before any interview.
We compare the bidders from public records only: shareholders and directors now and in the past, registered and trading addresses, phone numbers, domains, accountants and staff. Shared elements are graded by strength. We never contact the bidders, so nothing alerts them. If collusion looks likely, your counsel can consider reporting it to the competition authority.
Usually, where marriage, address or company records are available. We look for the director's other names, addresses shared with the manager, joint property and other companies they hold together. The report says how confident we are and what each conclusion rests on. A confirmed link is a conflict of interest to put to the manager through your HR and legal process.
Yes. We can profile the contractors, compare them with council officials in scope, and test for shared owners, relatives, addresses and assets out of line with salaries. Findings are graded and sourced, which helps you decide on a referral and gives the inspector general a clear starting point. Interviews and access to bank records belong to the authorities.
It sits between the two. Matching a full vendor list against staff is a structured screening exercise, with deeper investigation on the hits. A few hundred vendors usually take up to about a month, and we agree the matching criteria and data handling with you first. Going forward, supplier due diligence at onboarding prevents repeats.
It is written to be. Every fact has a source, a date and a capture, and each link is graded confirmed, likely or possible. Your lawyers can adapt the findings into evidence, and the analyst can explain the method if needed. Tell us the intended use at the start, so the format fits the hearing or claim.
Sources checked 10 October 2026. Figures about third-party firms and tools are as published by them or by the cited source on that date.